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STANDING IN THE WAKE OF STATUTES 
Mark Seidenfeld* & Allie Akre** 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that when Congress 
creates a legal interest to see that the law is followed, the deprivation of that 
interest, without more, is insufficient to allow a plaintiff to meet Article III’s 
standing requirements. Lujan created significant uncertainty about Congress’s 
ability to influence judicial standing inquiries by creating statutory rights, 
especially in light of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the majority’s footnote 
seven. This Article argues that Kennedy’s concurrence and footnote seven are best 
explained by recognizing that Congress is institutionally superior to courts in 
evaluating the gravity of likely harms and the causal chains between statutory 
violations and those harms—evaluations that may bear on whether a plaintiff has 
met the injury in fact and traceability elements of Article III standing. The Article 
takes this explanation further, contending that the structure of statutory provisions 
that do not create causes of action nonetheless reveal legislators’ likely 
understanding of the significance of certain harms, and the causal connections 
between those harms and statutory violations. Thus, legislators’ understandings 
should influence judges’ standing inquiries. Finally, the Article suggests that 
courts should rely on the purpose of statutory provisions to determine legislators’ 
understanding, which could guide a judge in evaluating injury in fact and 
traceability, given that the alternative is the subjective evaluation of the judge 
without meaningful constraint by relevant legal standards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses the role the legislature should play within the 
current doctrine of constitutional standing when a plaintiff sues to vindicate a right 
conferred by statute.1 Constitutional standing is a plaintiff’s ticket to the 
courthouse in every federal case.2 There are three “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” elements of standing: (1) injury in fact, which must be “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) traceability, which is “a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” that is “fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged action”; and (3) redressability, which means that “it 
must be ‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be 
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”3 In cases where the injury is alleged to be 
caused by ongoing conduct, the second and third elements collapse because a court 
can remedy the injury by enjoining the ongoing conduct. Thus, in most situations, 
redressability and traceability are two sides of the same coin: the causal nexus 
between the alleged wrongful conduct and plaintiff’s injury.  
The scope of congressional power to influence standing has been a source 
of significant controversy.4 Prior to the judicial creation of the current doctrine, a 
plaintiff had standing if he could demonstrate a deprivation of a legal interest—
that is, an interest recognized at common law or otherwise granted by statute.5 By 
creating statutory causes of action, Congress essentially provided standing for 
                                                                                                                
 1. This Article addresses standing in any action premised on statutory conferral 
of a benefit. It may address standing questions that arise in a constitutional claim when the 
claim asserts that a statutory benefit has been denied in contravention of the Constitution. 
See, e.g., infra, notes 139–43 and accompanying text (discussing Linda R.S., which 
involved an equal protection clause challenge to Texas courts’ interpretation that the State’s 
child support statute did not to apply to illegitimate children). 
 2. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 3. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 4. Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1050–52 (2009) (describing the debate between Liberals and 
Conservatives about Congress’s role in standing inquiries). 
 5. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, (1992) (describing the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s standing doctrine from the “legal interest” to the “injury in fact” test). 
2015] IN THE WAKE OF STATUTES 747 
persons to invoke the power of federal courts to the extent that Congress deemed 
warranted. In 1970, in an attempt to level the playing field for beneficiaries of 
regulatory statutes, the Supreme Court expanded the interests that give rise to 
standing to include injuries in fact caused by an alleged violation.6 Although the 
Court initially did not indicate that the injury-in-fact doctrine might limit the legal 
interest test, shortly after announcing that doctrine, the Court used it to deny 
standing to those who seemed to have legal interests that were statutorily 
protected.7 Ever since, the injury-in-fact doctrine has spawned a host of scholarly 
criticism of the injury in fact formulation of standing. 
Much of this critical scholarship on standing law advocates changes to 
fundamental aspects of standing law doctrine.8 Some scholars call for abandoning 
the traditional standing analysis,9 while some suggest a simplified approach to 
standing,10 and still others suggest adding to the doctrine’s three essential 
elements.11 But it seems highly unlikely that the Court will abandon or 
fundamentally modify its standing doctrine anytime soon. 
This Article pursues a line of scholarship that tries to make sense of the 
judicial opinions that apply the injury-in-fact formulation of standing. In particular, 
it focuses on the extent to which current law leaves Congress a significant role in 
influencing judicial determinations of standing elements.12 Like other scholarship 
in this line, this Article addresses the extent to which statutory influence fits within 
the framework presented in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.13  
                                                                                                                
 6. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–52 (1970); 
see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 183–85. 
 7. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972). 
 8. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 159, 177 (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 
223 (1988). 
 10. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 166–67. 
 11. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A 
Critique of Fletcher’s the Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 328 (2013) 
(suggesting incorporating into the current injury-in-fact inquiry “whether the harm befell the 
plaintiff by happenstance.”). 
 12. The authors do not express any opinion in this Article about whether it would 
be better to abandon current standing doctrine, which has been greatly criticized for 
allowing the courts to convert passive virtues into passive aggression. See, e.g., Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999) (finding 
support for the proposition that “judges provide [standing] to individuals who seek to 
further the political and ideological agendas of judges”); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling 
Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 669 (2004) (concluding after empirical study that federal 
courts of appeal decide standing cases based on ideology when there are insufficient 
precedents and judicial oversight to make a threat of reversal substantial); Emerson H. Tiller 
& Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine, 100 NW. L. REV. 517, 520 (2006) (“The most 
likely explanation for standing rules is a doctrinal attempt to influence the ideology of 
future lower court decisions.”). Rather, this Article limits its inquiry into Congress’s 
legitimate role within the core of current standing doctrine. 
 13. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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Although others have analyzed this important question, we believe that 
the existing scholarship has not paid close enough attention to the contours of the 
various Lujan opinions and subsequent Supreme Court opinions analyzing the 
relationship of statutory rights and structure to the standing inquiry. Specifically, 
this Article argues that Congress can influence standing analysis in several ways: 
(1) explicitly, through carefully crafted statutes that create causes of action to 
protect an identified interest; (2) implicitly, by creating procedural rights from 
which courts can infer congressional recognition of the causal connection between 
a plaintiff’s concrete interest and the denial of that procedure; (3) through the 
Court’s determination of Congress’s recognition of actual harms or causal 
connections from statutory structure or other circumstantial evidence; and (4) by 
judicial construction of statutory purpose as an indication of how the enacting 
Congress likely would have evaluated injuries and causal connections. 
Central to our argument is the notion that Congress cannot create 
standing, but that it can recognize interests and thereby influence judicial 
evaluation of whether an interest is sufficiently concrete and immediate to justify 
standing. Standing is predicated on actual injury to the plaintiff. As the Court in 
Lujan noted, “[statutory] broadening of the categories of injury that may be alleged 
in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that 
the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.”14 Therefore, this 
Article contends that although Congress cannot ignore Article III standing 
limitations, it has the power to elevate the status of legally cognizable concrete 
injuries “that were previously inadequate in law.”15 
Part I of this Article lays out a normative argument in favor of allowing 
Congress to recognize actual harms as injury-in-fact, and connections between 
statutory and regulatory violations and such injury as adequately traceable. Part II 
describes the majority holding in Lujan, which views standing law as limiting 
Congress’s prerogatives to authorize plaintiffs to use federal courts to remedy 
injuries that courts would otherwise find insufficient to satisfy standing criteria. 
Part III discusses Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan, and explains how it 
supports the thesis of this Article that Congress can influence standing by 
explicitly recognizing actual harms and causal connections. Part IV examines 
Justice Scalia’s footnote seven in Lujan, and explores the implications of 
procedural rights as a means for Congress implicitly to influence standing. Part V 
discusses how the structure of statutory provisions and other circumstantial 
evidence can imply Congress’s recognition of harms and causal connections on 
standing. Part VI suggests that it is often appropriate for judges to go beyond 
statutory text and structure—that is, to consider statutory purpose as derived from 
context—as part of their inquiries into standing. Judges can then discern 
                                                                                                                
 14. Id. at 578 (internal citation omitted); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
501 (1975) (stating that although “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons 
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules . . . [Article] III’s requirement 
remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself.”). 
 15. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
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legislators’ understanding of the significance of potential injuries and the 
likelihood of causal connections in evaluating standing in particular cases. 
I. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR CONGRESS’S ROLE IN STANDING 
A. Congress’s Institutional Superiority 
Standing often depends on attributes of the injury alleged that are better 
evaluated by Congress than by the judiciary. The Court has made clear that a 
plaintiff cannot utilize the federal courts to redress an ideological objection to 
prohibited conduct: The desire to see the law followed is never an injury in fact.16 
For injuries that are too abstract or trivial, however, one might question whether a 
desire to see the law followed, rather than the injury remedied, truly drove the 
plaintiff to sue. This uncertainty might help explain the doctrinal requirement that 
injuries-in-fact be sufficiently concrete and palpable in order to support standing.  
Some injuries, such as physical injuries and loss of property, are 
sufficiently palpable, so there is no doubt about whether the plaintiff has suffered 
them. In some cases, however, the Court has allowed plaintiffs who allege injuries 
that are not easily verified to sue in federal courts. For example, the Court has 
allowed plaintiffs to sue for affronts to their aesthetic sensibilities.17 It has 
suggested that even emotional injuries, such as fear or stigma, may suffice as 
injury in fact.18 For cases involving these less tangible injuries, the Court has to 
answer two questions: First, is the nature of the injury grave enough to warrant 
allowing the harmed person to invoke the courts to redress the injury? Second, 
because the injury cannot be directly verified, is it reasonable to believe that a 
person in the plaintiff’s position would actually suffer such injury in response to 
the alleged wrongful act?  
In many cases, Congress will be better at answering these questions than 
the courts because there is no objective scale by which to measure whether a 
particular kind of injury is sufficiently concrete and significant to warrant invoking 
                                                                                                                
 16. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) 
(“[A]lthough a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States 
Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation's laws are 
faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because 
it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 (rejecting 
violation of “an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive 
observe the procedures required by law” as injury in fact); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
754 (1984). See also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 188–89 (characterizing the Court as 
“classifying some harms as injuries in fact and other harms as purely ideological”). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686–88 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
734 (1972) (dicta stating that aesthetic harm can be injury in fact). 
 18. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 
U.S. 167, 184–85 (2000) (finding fear to be injury in fact); Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (dicta 
stating that stigma “is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government 
action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing”). 
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a judicial remedy.19 That sufficiency depends on an assessment of the impact that a 
person who is injured by the violation is likely to perceive. The assessment 
essentially involves an informed value judgment.20 Congress is institutionally 
better situated than courts to make such a determination because its members are 
both closer to the people and more accountable to the polity generally than are 
judges, who regard these questions through the lens of a closed record created by a 
formal judicial process.21 
Moreover, courts are, by their very nature, bound to legal judgment, 
which suggests that they tread on suspect ground when they override value 
judgments made by the political branches of government.22 When questions cannot 
be resolved by objective means, it is ultimately up to the elected representatives of 
the people to resolve them.23 In these instances, “federal judges—who have no 
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices of those who do.”24 
As Justice Scalia noted, albeit in a somewhat different context, “there is no right 
answer to how many injuries are worth how much cost. It is essentially something 
you vote on and not analyze.”25 From this, one can surmise that even Scalia, the 
strongest proponent of limiting congressional influence over standing, cannot 
                                                                                                                
 19. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 231–33 (arguing that, conceptually, injury in 
fact is incapable of distinguishing between plaintiffs who honestly allege some injury); 
Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 897, 
926–29 (defining injury as a “setback to a person’s interest” but then noting that “the task of 
determining what interests matter is a subjective one—perhaps hopelessly so”); Sunstein, 
supra note 5, at 188–89 (determining what counts as injury in fact is a value-laden 
judgment). See also Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1194 (2014) 
(“[A]dequate factual injury is the touchstone of the Court’s standing analysis—except when 
it isn’t.”). In short, there is no acceptable metric for what a judge will find sufficiently 
concrete. Cf. Lin, supra, at 938 (concluding that the concept of harm for standing is not 
entirely subjective but depends on community norms). 
 20. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 
42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1155 (1993) (“[T]he injury determination necessarily entails an 
exploration of what we wish to recognize as harm.”). 
 21. Cf. William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 938 (2013) (suggesting 
that the Court should defer to Congress’s determinations in equal protection cases because 
the Court’s “doctrine requires judgments that Congress is better suited to make”); Note, A 
Chevron for the House and Senate: Deferring to Post-Enactment Congressional Resolutions 
That Interpret Ambiguous Statutes, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (2011) (The superior 
political accountability of the houses of Congress gives “each . . . a comparative 
institutional advantage over courts in making democratic value judgments”). 
 22. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 159 (2012). 
 23. Id. at 193. 
 24. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 626 (1996). 
 25. Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 191, 196 (1986). 
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easily disavow Congress’s superior capacity to evaluate the gravity of alleged 
injuries.26 
In addition, standing depends on traceability and redressability, which in 
the usual case depends on the likelihood that the alleged wrongful conduct caused 
the injury. When that likelihood is evaluated based on the probability of harm to 
individuals who fall within a broad class potentially affected by the wrongful 
conduct, the inquiry is no longer one about the particular party to the proceeding. It 
becomes an inquiry of “legislative fact” (i.e., facts of a general nature about how 
people perceive and are likely to react to specific events or stimuli).27 As the label 
suggests, Congress enjoys an institutional advantage over courts in that inquiry.28 
The expansive fact-finding mechanisms of the legislature render Congress 
better equipped to identify these causal connections, which depend on such factors 
as technical effects of violations of the law and likely third-party reactions to those 
violations. Congress enjoys superior information gathering capabilities.29 It has the 
authority to demand information from those with expertise about general causal 
relations and is not limited to the facts that particular parties were able to marshal 
and introduce into the record. Congress, unlike the judiciary, is not “shackled by 
the temporal and reactive nature of litigation.”30 The legislature is not limited by 
time constraints, prohibitions on information-gathering techniques (such as ex 
                                                                                                                
 26. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (noting that the gravity of a 
harm that a person shares with a large segment of the populous “is a fair subject for 
democratic debate in which he may persuade the rest of us”). Justice Scalia’s objection to 
Congress influencing standing is grounded in his view that the role of courts is “protecting 
individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority.” Id. Despite Scalia’s attempts 
to demonstrate that the Court’s role has historically been so understood, his assertion that 
Article III precludes Congress from authorizing courts to protect against harms shared 
widely by the public where Congress has created a cause of action is questionable at best. 
See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459–500 (1965). 
 27. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) (“[T]he facts which inform [an 
agency’s] legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts”). 
 28. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative 
Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1986) (“Unlike legislators and unlike administrative rulemakers, courts are often 
inadequately informed about democratic desires . . . . [C]ourts often have inadequate 
legislative facts, that is, the facts that bear on the court’s choices about law and policy.”); 
Phillip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19, 38 (1969) 
(“[T]he Court . . . lacks machinery for gathering the wide range of facts and opinions that 
should inform the judgment of a prime policymaker.”); but cf. Neal Devins, Congressional 
Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 
1179–81 (2000) (noting that Congress has superior capabilities for legislative fact finding, 
but may lack sufficient motivation to find such facts accurately). 
 29. Kate T. Spelman, Revising Judicial Review of Legislative Findings of 
Scientific and Medical “Fact”: A Modified Due Process Approach, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 837, 857–59 (2009). 
 30. Devins, supra note 28, at 1180. 
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parte communications), stare decisis, or the ways parties frame a case.31 Indeed, 
Congress’s fact-finding resources are vast compared to the Court’s; they include 
more funds, staff, and procedures devoted to information gathering.32 Moreover, 
“[t]he greater number of members and their varied backgrounds and experience 
make it virtually certain that the typical legislature will command wider 
knowledge and keener appreciation of current social and economic conditions than 
will the typical court.”33 As Professor Bill Buzbee points out, “[f]rom a 
comparative institutional analysis perspective, courts are simply unsuited to 
evaluate independently either general legislative judgments about statutory goals 
and process or the significance of particular legal breaches and associated 
litigation.”34 In sum, evaluating the gravity of injury and its connection to statutory 
violation involves both findings of legislative fact, at which Congress is more 
adept than courts, and determining the desirability of value-laden trade-offs, which 
must rely on the democratic accountability of Congress. 
B. Defense of Imputing Congressional Understanding 
It is one thing to assert Congress’s superiority in evaluating injuries and 
causal chains that give rise to standing; it is another to assert that imputation of 
such understanding based on statutes Congress enacts should influence judicial 
standing inquiries. In virtually no statute does Congress explicitly evaluate the 
gravity of injuries that might be caused by statutory violations or the causal 
connections between such violations and those injuries. As will become clear from 
our discussion that follows, we infer legislators’ likely understanding of the 
significance of injuries and causal connections from the statutory provisions they 
enact. Thus, our arguments for having courts credit statutory influence on standing 
essentially mimic those that purposivist interpreters use to attribute meaning to 
statutory provisions. 
For the purposivist,35 “[t]he Court’s job is . . . to determine the 
background policy at which Congress was driving, and then to read the statute to 
carry out that purpose.”36 Purposivists look beyond statutory text to the context in 
which the legislation was enacted, including legislative history in its broadest 
                                                                                                                
 31. Id. at 1179–80. 
 32. Id. at 1178–79. 
 33. Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 
U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 209 (1971). 
 34. William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 247, 279–80 (2001). 
 35. Purposivism is usually contrasted with Textualism, which seeks to find the 
best public meaning of the words of a statute at the time it was enacted. For a discussion of 
the distinctions between Textualism and Purposivism, as they are currently invoked, see 
generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM L. 
REV. 70 (2006) 
 36. John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2014). 
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sense.37 They may also consider changes in circumstances that would suggest how 
a legislator who supported the purpose of the statute would apply it in a context 
that Congress may not have considered.38 The same techniques may be used to 
determine how legislators’ would evaluate the significance of harms against which 
the statute protects or the causal connections between statutory violations and 
those harms in a context that goes beyond what the statute envisioned.  
We must be candid, however, that surmising legislators’ likely 
understanding of the significance of injuries and causal nexus supposes a 
“reasonable legislator” for whom statutory provisions aim to achieve a coherent 
goal.39 Essentially, our construction of legislative understanding reflects how a 
judge envisions legislators would have understood these factors had those voting 
for the statute actually considered them. Hence, we cannot justify use of 
purposivist inference by arguing that the understandings it reveals necessarily 
represent a legislative consensus about the elements of standing. Like purposivist 
interpretation, our approach reflects a sharing of determinations of policy between 
the legislature and the interpreting judge.40 Nonetheless, we believe that the use of 
purposivist techniques is especially defensible when guiding judges’ standing 
inquiries. 
Various aspects of imputing legislative purpose are, in some sense, 
convenient oversimplifications. Such oversimplifications lie at the heart of several 
critiques of purposivism by proponents of alternative schools of statutory 
interpretation. One critique challenges purposivism’s assumption that a single 
purpose motivates a statutory provision.41 Contrary to the legal process view,42 
legislation is a process of bargaining between members of Congress who may have 
                                                                                                                
 37. See Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking 
Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1648 (2014) [hereinafter Rethinking 
Legislative Intent] (“[P]urposivists seem to be willing to look for statutory evidence of 
purpose based on all sorts of evidence that Congress may or may not have had before it—
regulations, advisory committee reports”). 
 38. See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2009) (identifying “translation theory . . . as a version of purposivism 
that tries to map original understandings onto changed circumstances by boosting the level 
of generality at which those understandings are defined”). 
 39. Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (when interpreting a statute a 
judge should assume that “the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing 
reasonable purposes reasonably”). 
 40. See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, 
the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation Of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1169 
(2011). 
 41. See Nourse, Rethinking Legislative Intent, supra note 37, at 1623. 
 42. Purposivism derives, in large part, from the work of the legal process 
theorists Hart and Sacks, who contended that an interpreter should decide what purpose 
should be attributed to any relevant provision of a statute and then should interpret those 
words “so as to carry out the purpose as best it can.” HART & SACKS, supra note 39, at 1374. 
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different goals.43 Thus, statutes often involve an explicit balance of purposes, and 
the furtherance of one will often undermine another.44 Even if the legislative 
process does not explicitly identify competing purposes, there is always the 
competing purpose of cost. Pursuing any purpose single-mindedly will quickly 
lead to unacceptable deprivation of resources from other crucial needs of society.45 
For this reason, the workability of purposivism requires judges to identify a 
purpose that incorporates some limiting principle. Yet, any limiting principle 
depends on the level of generality at which purposivism operates—the more 
specifically the judicially chosen purpose relates to the particular statutory text at 
issue, the more likely it is to incorporate limits that constrain judicial 
interpretation.46 Traditional purposivism, however, provides little constraint on 
judges when choosing the level of generality of the statutory purpose and hence on 
the ability of judges to sway interpretive outcomes to their preferences.47 
But recognizing an injury as sufficiently grave in nature and likely to 
result from a statutory violation does not pose the same line drawing problems as 
defining how far a statutory purpose extends. Allowing individuals to sue in 
federal court to protect an interest does not commit the court regarding the extent 
to which the statute protects that interest. In other words, finding an implicit or 
constructive congressional understanding that an injury warrants judicial 
protection does not preclude the court from determining that the statute 
implements a balance between competing interests or from interpreting or applying 
the statute contrary to the plaintiff’s interest. 
In addition, the lack of alternative means to constrain judicial discretion 
with respect to congressional understandings regarding injuries and causal 
connections makes purposivist techniques less objectionable for standing inquiries 
than for questions of statutory interpretation. In the interpretation context, 
textualist critics of purposivism complain that legislative history is too easily 
manipulated by members of Congress to support interpretations that do not reflect 
bargains actually made to obtain passage of the legislation.48 Textualists also 
                                                                                                                
 43. See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in 
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992) (“legislation usually results from 
bargaining among numerous parties having a wider diversity of purposes”); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2007) (“[P]roponents of legislation typically must 
compromise with the moderates whose support is necessary to create a majority coalition.”). 
 44. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 467, 482 (2014). 
 45. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 541 
(1983) (“No matter how good the end in view, achievement of the end will have some cost, 
and at some point the cost will begin to exceed the benefits.”). 
 46. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 404–
05 (2012) (describing the generality problem posed by purposivist statutory interpretation). 
 47. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 151–
53. 
 48. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 376–77 (2012); John F. Manning, Chevron and 
Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1538 n.119 (2014) (quoting from Exxon 
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criticize judicial reliance on legislative history as too malleable to constrain judges 
from imposing their own preferences.49 Textualists propose, instead, reliance on 
objective rules for decoding the meaning of statutory text, which they claim 
provide greater constraint against such judicial abuse.50 
Statutory text, however, rarely evaluates the potential harms caused by 
statutory or regulatory violations directly. Thus, except in those rare cases where 
Congress includes a provision that expressly communicates an understanding 
about the significance of the potential injury or causal connections stemming from 
such violations, there is no alternative for evaluating such understanding superior 
to purposivist techniques. When evaluating those elements of standing, the 
alternative to those techniques is unguided subjective judgment by individual 
judges.51 A judge might try to justify her judgment about whether a plaintiff in 
particular circumstances has demonstrated standing by comparison with other 
cases or analogy to other injuries. But, under current standing doctrine, there are 
no well-accepted standards that govern whether the elements of standing have 
been adequately satisfied. This may be why standing doctrine has been criticized 
for being extremely susceptible to judicial manipulation, whether deliberate or 
unconscious.52 
Given this alternative, asking judges to relate their standing inquiry to the 
mischief at which a statutory provision seems aimed, although not outcome 
determinative, will provide a more meaningful yardstick for evaluating 
determinations with respect to the elements of standing.53 That is, the nature of the 
                                                                                                                
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)). See also Seidenfeld, 
supra note 44, at 478–79. 
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 50. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and The Canons: 
Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 784 (2014); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of 
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2001). 
 51. See Re, supra note 19, at 1195 & 1195 nn. 20–23; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., 
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 305, 315 
(2002) (“What is missing [from the Court’s standing doctrine], in the end, is a formula to 
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ignored.”). See also Fletcher, supra note 9, at 231 (criticizing the injury in fact requirement 
as incoherent because it seeks a neutral answer to a question that requires a normative 
structure). 
 52. See supra note 12 (citing examples of such criticism). 
 53. Framed in terms of Fletcher’s critique, imaginative reconstruction can 
provide the normative framework for evaluating whether the plaintiff-alleged injury is 
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matter at which a statute is aimed would provide more objective criteria to 
evaluate standing decisions than the purely subjective “I know it when I see it” 
standard that judges implicitly invoke. In addition, referring to the mischief that 
the statute seems to target will result in standing determinations that fit more 
coherently with the perceived purposes of the statute that the plaintiff claims the 
defendant violated. That is, by using statutory text, structure, and purpose to 
impute a legislative evaluation of injuries and their causal connections to statutory 
violations, judges will deflect criticism for using their own sensibilities to decide 
standing issues in a manner that undermines the interests that the statute seems 
structured to protect. 
II. THE LUJAN MAJORITY & THE IMPORTANCE OF ARTICLE II 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court tied standing law to 
the President’s power to enforce the law.54 Lujan involved a challenge to a rule, 
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, interpreting the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or 
on the high seas.55 The plaintiffs alleged that the lack of consultation with respect 
to foreign activities increased the rate of extinction of endangered species.56 
Specifically, the Court focused on two members of the plaintiff organization who 
alleged that they intended to return to habitats of particular endangered species, 
and that the rule reduced the likelihood of them seeing members of those species.57 
The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a concrete injury and demonstrate 
redressability.58 
Of particular interest with respect to Congress’s ability to influence 
standing, Lujan declined to grant the plaintiffs standing based on the citizen-suit 
provision of the statute.59 Prior to Lujan, Professor (now Judge) William Fletcher’s 
critique of standing provided the most academically accepted alternative to the 
current doctrine’s requirements of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.60 
Fletcher concluded that the case or controversy requirement should be satisfied as 
long as Congress provided a cause of action that authorized a particular plaintiff to 
                                                                                                                
sufficient to warrant granting him access to federal courts. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 
229–34. 
 54. 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). 
 55. Id. at 557–58. 
 56. Id. at 562. 
 57. Id. at 563. 
 58. Id. at 562–68. 
 59. Id. at 576 (“Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation 
of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would 
be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the 
Third Branch—one of the essential elements that identifies those ‘Cases’ and 
‘Controversies’ that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.”). 
 60. In the words of Heather Elliott, “[Fletcher’s] The Structure of Standing has 
become an ever more incisive critique of standing doctrine. It has been cited hundreds of 
times by scholars and courts, including the Supreme Court itself. It has been called ‘simply 
the best thing ever written on ”standing.” Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25: 
Introduction to the Symposium, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269, 270–71 (2013). 
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sue.61 The Lujan Court, however, reasoned that allowing citizens to enforce the 
law usurps the power of the executive branch and interferes with the Take Care 
Clause of Article II.62 Although the Court grounded its ultimate analysis in Article 
III, by considering the President’s enforcement prerogatives the Lujan majority 
rationale can be understood as viewing Article II as a limit on Congress’s ability to 
enact statutes that influence standing.63 Lujan pointed out that rendering standing 
coterminous with a cause of action, as Fletcher advocated, would essentially allow 
Congress to deputize private citizens to enforce the law.64 As a result, this 
rendering would undermine the role of the executive branch to see that the law is 
faithfully executed and to prosecute violations of it.65 
The Court’s holding regarding the relation of standing doctrine to Article 
II limited the effect of citizen-suit provisions to creating a cause of action that a 
plaintiff may assert only if she meets the requirements of standing. This holding is 
central to the focus of this Article because it serves as a limitation on Congress’s 
ability to influence standing. The emphasis on a concrete injury-in-fact, as opposed 
to an injury to a legal interest, ensures that the plaintiff cannot simply enforce the 
law, but must attempt to vindicate her personal interest. This emphasis shapes the 
remainder of this Article’s analysis. 
III. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S LUJAN CONCURRENCE 
Congress’s role in recognizing the harms and chains of causation that 
give rise to standing is supported by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan.66 
This concurrence is extremely significant because both Justices Kennedy and 
Souter, who joined the concurrence, supported Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. 
Their votes were necessary for Scalia’s opinion to garner majority status. Thus, 
Kennedy’s concurrence reflects the position of the median voter on the Court67 
and, for that reason, arguably is the law with respect to Congress’s ability to 
identify injury that satisfies standing.68 Moreover, the majority in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, states that congressional “authorization [of this type of judicial challenge] is 
                                                                                                                
 61. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 229. 
 62. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated 
public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ 
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the 
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed, Art. II, § 3.”). 
 63. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 831–32 (2009). 
 64.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78. 
 65. Id. at 577.  
 66. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 67. Buzbee, supra note 34, at 257–60 (noting that Justices Kennedy and Souter 
joined Part IV of the majority opinion but added “observations” that qualify the majority 
opinion). 
 68. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (announcing what is 
essentially the median voter rule for determining the holding of a split court); Saul 
Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87, 
94–96 (2002) (describing the Marks rule and its relation to the median voter criterion). 
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of critical importance to the standing inquiry,”69 and then proceeds to quote critical 
language from Kennedy’s Lujan concurrence.70 This suggests that the Court has 
accepted Kennedy’s concurrence as the prevailing law. Thus, determining the 
concurrence’s precise meaning is of utmost importance. 
Justice Kennedy’s language in Lujan is ambiguous yet illustrative. There 
is a tension between his professed understanding of Congress’s role and the precise 
words he uses. He begins describing his understanding of injury-in-fact by noting 
the importance of concreteness and imminence.71 He then proceeds to discuss his 
view of Congress’s ability to influence standing inquiries. He explicitly states that, 
in light of the increasing complexity and reach of government programs and 
policies, Congress has a role “in the articulation of new rights of action that do not 
have clear analogs in common law tradition.”72 He continues by asserting that 
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that 
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”73 But he 
concludes by placing a limit on that congressional role, requiring that “[i]n 
exercising this power . . . Congress must at the very least identify the injury it 
seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring 
suit.”74 
Much of the confusion about Justice Kennedy’s opinion lies in its 
statement that Congress can define injuries, because Kennedy joined in the 
majority opinion, which foreclosed congressionally created standing. But a more 
careful reading of Kennedy’s entire concurrence helps resolve this seeming 
contradiction. First, Kennedy does not understand the majority to hold that 
Congress cannot play the role he outlines.75 He tries to resolve the seeming 
inconsistency between his opinion and the Lujan majority with crucial language 
that reinforces the importance of a concrete injury and discusses the limitations on 
Congress’s power: 
The Court’s holding that there is an outer limit to the power of 
Congress to confer rights of action is a direct and necessary 
consequence of the case and controversy limitations found in 
Article III. I agree that it would exceed those limitations if, at the 
                                                                                                                
 69. 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007). See also William Buzbee et al., Access to Courts 
after Massachusetts v. EPA: Who Has Been Left Standing? 37 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW 
INST.) 10692, 10697 (Sept. 2007). 
 70. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–17. 
 71. “Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he ‘has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged 
official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting L.A. v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983)). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. After asserting Congress’s power to define injuries and articulate chains of 
causation, Justice Kennedy wrote: “I do not read the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary 
view.” Id. 
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behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing of 
concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the 
public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the 
laws. . . . [T]he party bringing suit must show that the action 
injures him in a concrete and personal way. This requirement is 
not just an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the 
adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before the 
court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the 
outcome, and that “the legal questions presented . . . will be 
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but 
in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation 
of the consequences of judicial action.”76 
The underlying message seems clear—abstract injuries are outside the 
scope of Congress’s ability to give rise to standing—yet Congress has some role in 
identifying injuries that are sufficient to support standing. This still leaves 
unanswered several crucial questions: What does it mean to define new injuries? 
And what is the outer limit of Congress’s power to do so? 
Scholars have attempted to clarify this matter, albeit not in a particularly 
convincing manner. One approach reads Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as 
granting Congress broad powers to create standing, as long as Congress does so 
through carefully drafted legislation.77 We term this approach the “express 
legislation” interpretation of Kennedy’s concurrence, and believe that it reflects 
the historical understanding that denial of a legal right is the essence of injury 
sufficient for standing.78 The express legislation interpretation essentially relies on 
the fact that the injury-in-fact test was meant to liberalize standing, not to deny 
Congress a power it historically had exercised.79 Congress’s legislative power 
includes the “authority to create rights of action by statute by defining injuries and 
causal relationships” between prohibited conduct and those injuries.80 And because 
those causes of action create legal rights, the express legislation interpretation 
reasons that, in the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), Congress could grant 
standing to citizens by “identify[ing] or creat[ing] a general public interest in 
endangered species, and provid[ing] explicitly that the deprivation of that interest 
constitutes an injury that a federal court must vindicate at the behest of any 
citizen.”81 In other words, historically, Congress has had the statutory authority to 
create legal protection for nonconcrete injuries. It also essentially had the authority 
                                                                                                                
 76. Id. at 580–81. 
 77. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a 
Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1181 (1993); Sunstein, 
supra note 5, at 202. 
 78. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 73–74 
(1984) (noting that one goal of the injury in fact doctrine was to “liberalize access to the 
federal courts”). 
 80. Pierce, supra note 77, at 1180–81. 
 81. Id. at 1181. 
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to create standing based on the deprivation of that legal protection, as long as the 
statute was sufficiently explicit about to whom it provided such protections.  
Moreover, Congress has historically been permitted to “create quite novel 
property interests.”82 Under the express legislation interpretation, therefore, the 
constitutional flaw in the Lujan plaintiffs’ assertion of standing was that “[the] 
plaintiffs had no property right under the ESA, because Congress failed explicitly 
to define the relevant injury when it provided for citizen suits.”83 This broad 
construction of the concurrence relies chiefly on Justice Kennedy’s statement that 
Congress can define new injuries and articulate new chains of causation. 
Ultimately, however, the express legislation theory is problematic because it fails 
to take into account Kennedy’s explicit rejection of the possibility of abstract 
injuries giving rise to standing, even at the “behest of Congress.”84 
Another interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which we term 
the “minimal effect” approach, reads his opinion as stopping short of providing 
any meaningful distinction from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion or any novel 
idea about the standing doctrine. Under this theory, “Kennedy’s sentence about 
being able to create a case or controversy where none existed before is simply his 
way of repeating the truism that the Court has stated for years—that Congress may 
create new rights, the violation of which might well constitute concrete injury-in-
fact as judged by the Court.”85 Under the minimal effect approach, because it is the 
Court, not Congress, that decides what injuries are concrete, Congress’s role in 
standing is no greater than that of a party to the case—it can merely identify 
injuries that the Court might find sufficient to support standing.86 Any ability to 
“upgrade” factually diffuse injuries that would otherwise be inadequate to confer 
standing is marginal. Intangible harms would still be insufficient to establish 
standing, regardless of any contrary statements that Congress includes in the 
statute.87 Professor Heather Elliott has opined that the Court is likely to adopt the 
minimal effects approach,88 concluding that “Congress’s power is to convert de 
facto into de jure and nothing more.”89 Although this approach is correct in 
acknowledging that Kennedy’s concurrence is not an endorsement of 
congressionally created standing, it shortchanges the important institutional role 
Congress has in recognizing actual harms that give rise to standing. 
                                                                                                                
 82. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 235–36. 
 83. Id. at 234. 
 84. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 85. Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty 
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 Although each of these theories is supported by some part of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, that opinion is best viewed as a whole and in the context 
of the majority opinion. Our reading of Kennedy’s concurrence explores 
Congress’s ability to influence standing while explicitly assuming that that ability 
is neither plenary nor null. We further read Kennedy’s concurrence as 
acknowledging that Congress has the power to recognize actual harms and causal 
connections and, thereby, can give rise to standing for injuries that the Court might 
otherwise find attenuated or insufficiently concrete. 
Three factors support the conclusion that Justice Kennedy understands 
that Congress has the authority to recognize actual harms that give rise to standing 
but not to create purely legal interests whose deprivation would do so. First, 
Kennedy’s concurrence made a clear effort to go beyond the majority to demarcate 
some congressional power with respect to standing.90 Although the use of terms 
“define and articulate” may be imprecise, the main point of Kennedy’s 
concurrence clarified that Congress can influence whether a particular matter rises 
to the level of case or controversy. Second, Kennedy’s opinion repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of concreteness for injury in fact.91 Thus, Kennedy’s 
proposed role for Congress is tempered by his insistence that it is beyond the scope 
of Congress’s authority to render a suit to protect nonconcrete interests justiciable. 
This clear distinction between the abstract and the concrete was further 
underscored when Kennedy joined the majority opinion’s Article II rationale that 
prohibits Congress from deputizing private parties to enforce the law.92 Hence, 
Kennedy’s concurrence provides a complement rather than a substitute for Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion. Third, Kennedy’s post-Lujan opinions continue to point 
to a limited power of Congress to recognize injuries and causal chains that 
otherwise would be insufficient to support standing. For example, in his 
concurrence in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, Kennedy poignantly points out 
that “[n]othing in the statute at issue here . . . indicates Congress intended to 
identify or confer some interest separate and apart from a procedural right.”93 
The textual support in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is bolstered by our 
normative argument that Congress is institutionally superior at assessing the 
degree of injuries that are foreseeable from statutory violations.94 In fact, 
Kennedy’s concurrence can be seen as a guide to how Congress’s institutional 
superiority should play out in particular cases. It essentially directs the courts to 
defer to understandings about impacts from statutory violations that can be 
discerned from the causes of action a statute provides. 
The following example illustrates an injury that we believe would suffice 
to establish a plaintiff’s standing under our reading of Justice Kennedy’s Lujan 
concurrence, but not under the Scalia majority opinion. Suppose that Congress had 
included a provision in the ESA authorizing zookeepers to sue to protect 
                                                                                                                
 90. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 92. See supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 93. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 501 (2009). 
 94. See supra Section I.A. 
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endangered species with which they worked in captivity. Suppose further that the 
statute explicitly recognized that zookeepers need captured wild animals to keep 
captive stocks from being genetically inbred. In that hypothetical scenario, 
Congress would have identified that the injury applies to a specified class of 
people—zookeepers. Second, Congress would also have articulated the chain of 
causation between the injury and the class of persons entitled to bring suit—the 
loss of a species would hinder zookeepers’ ability to maintain viable captive 
populations. Third, the injury would be to an interest that exists independently of 
any rights granted by the statute. As such, Congress would have identified an 
actual injury and not merely expressed a desire to see the law enforced. This 
hypothetical provision would, therefore, seem directly to meet Kennedy’s 
requirements for Congress to grant standing. Moreover, this example is most 
interesting because the Lujan majority states, “It goes beyond the limit [of 
plausibility] . . . to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered 
species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting 
some portion of that species with which he has no more specific connection.”95 
Thus, the precise interest that would give rise to standing under this statute was 
explicitly held to be insufficient by the Lujan majority. 
We also believe that standing is normatively appropriate in this 
hypothetical scenario. As discussed earlier, whether the effect on a zookeeper from 
the loss of wild stock to replenish captive genetics is sufficiently palpable to 
comprise injury in fact comes down to a value judgment. There is no right or 
wrong answer, and no objective standard for evaluating whether the injury to 
zookeepers is sufficient. Congress is better able than the courts to answer this 
question because it is more in tune with the ultimate values of the people and 
because it is institutionally better able to determine the likely effect of this loss of 
wild stock. 
In sum, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence illustrates an important avenue by 
which Congress can influence standing, even under current doctrine. It recognizes 
Justice Scalia’s point that the executive is responsible for executing the law and 
that Congress cannot deputize private citizens to do so. But, it goes beyond the 
majority by recognizing that Congress has a role in identifying injuries and causal 
connections sufficient to meet the Court’s standing requirements. 
IV. LUJAN’S FOOTNOTE SEVEN 
Although Justice Kennedy’s Lujan concurrence suggests the need for 
Congress to explicitly recognize concrete injuries and chains of causation, Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion suggests that congressional creation of general 
procedural rights, without more, can affect the judicial inquiry into standing. In 
footnote seven of the majority, Scalia opines that a person “who has been accorded 
a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without 
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”96 Although 
footnote seven does not explain why such rights might affect the standing inquiry, 
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we posit that the best explanation hinges on Congress having implicitly recognized 
causal connections and the imminence of any concrete injury at issue by providing 
procedural rights. 
Just as Justice Kennedy’s concurrence has prompted a variety of 
interpretations, so has Justice Scalia’s footnote seven. A broad reading of the 
footnote would lower a plaintiff’s burden to show traceability and redressability 
generally, and might even relieve a plaintiff of making any showing of these 
elements at all.97 This reading, however, is hard to square with the entirety of 
Scalia’s majority opinion, which rejects standing with respect to some injuries that 
the plaintiff alleged because those injuries were not redressable.98 Additionally, 
reading footnote seven as an invitation for courts to relax traceability/redressability 
to an extreme extent creates tension with the rest of the majority opinion because a 
plaintiff with a procedural right could obtain standing by alleging an immediate 
and concrete injury whose relation to the defendant’s wrongful act was far-fetched. 
Essentially, this would convert a procedural right and a citizen suit provision into 
virtually guaranteed standing. 
The very nature of what footnote seven means by “a procedural right” is 
also an issue. For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court considered a 
citizen suit provision to be a procedural right and relied on footnote seven to 
reduce the plaintiff’s burden of showing the traceability of the alleged injury to the 
impacts of the EPA’s failure to address the effect of automobile carbon emissions 
on climate change.99 This stretch of the procedural right to which footnote seven 
refers is in tension with the entirety of the Lujan majority, which explicitly rejects 
the notion that a procedural right can be transformed into an interest that 
constitutes injury-in-fact.100 Instead, footnote seven is better read to reflect the idea 
that courts should give deference in their standing inquiries to Congress’s 
determination that a procedure with which an agency is required to comply before 
acting is important to prevent potential concrete impacts that the action would 
threaten. This reading is both consistent with the majority holding and normatively 
sensible because it avoids courts having to draw arbitrary lines that other 
interpretations necessitate. 
In analyzing the meaning of footnote seven, it is imperative to note at the 
outset that it refers to procedural rights, not procedural injuries. The majority 
rejects the notion that statutory violations rise to the level of injuries because they 
are not concrete, actual harms. Recognizing purely procedural violations as 
injuries would undermine Article II’s Take Care Clause because it would 
essentially deputize private entities that have no concrete interest at stake to sue to 
force compliance with legally mandated procedures.101 Procedural rights, however, 
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can affect how courts evaluate whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the 
usual standing requirements of injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability. 
Footnote seven gives an example of how a procedural right would alter 
the usual standing inquiry. It considers the proposed building of a dam that 
requires an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) before construction 
commences. The footnote explicitly states that a person living adjacent to the 
proposed construction site will not be denied standing because “he cannot establish 
with any certainty that the [EIS] will cause the license to be withheld or altered.”102 
This statement, in combination with Justice Scalia’s earlier mention of relaxed 
redressability and immediacy standards, has led some scholars to suggest that all 
that is needed for standing, with respect to procedural rights, is a showing of a 
concrete injury.103 Once again, this suggestion contrasts with the rest of the 
majority’s opinion in Lujan, which denied plaintiffs standing partly because of the 
lack of redressability. 
Although all agree that footnote seven does not excuse a plaintiff from 
meeting the concrete injury requirement, what remains ambiguous is the degree to 
which the redressability and immediacy requirements are relaxed.104 Some 
scholars have grappled with the question of the Court’s authority to relax or lower 
the standards of redressability given that Article III mandates both injury-in-fact 
and redressability as prerequisites for standing.105 Professor Cass Sunstein has 
argued that the very notion that the Court can relax the redressability standard 
suggests that it is really an irrelevant requirement.106 Although we agree with 
Professor Sunstein’s assessment of Congress’s role in creating procedural rights 
                                                                                                                
without any showing that the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the 
plaintiff (apart from his interest in having the procedure observed).” Id. at 573 n.8. 
 102. Id. at 572 n.7. 
 103. Morris, supra note 97, at 75 (stating that even when redressability cannot be 
shown, “a citizen who can articulate a concrete, particularized interest within the protection 
of the statute should be able to establish standing to challenge violations of the statutory 
procedure”). See also William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of 
Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 
803 (1997) (stating “[t]he lesson of Defenders’ footnote[] seven . . . seemed to be that no 
certainty or even probability of changed outcomes is necessary when a plaintiff with a 
threatened concrete interest complains of a procedural irregularity”). 
 104. Christopher T. Burt, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (1995) (stating that footnote seven is “at 
best . . . vague and provides little guidance for prospective plaintiffs and the lower courts; at 
worst, it eviscerates the standing requirements of the Constitution”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Sunstein has stated, “I think that the Court’s . . . [relaxation of redressability 
standards] exemplifies several of the problems associated with the whole notion of 
redressability. A procedural right is created, not because it necessarily yields particular 
outcomes, but because it structures incentives and creates pressures that Congress has 
deemed important to effective regulation. . . . Congress is attempting not to dictate 
outcomes but to create procedural guarantees that will produce certain regulatory incentives. 
Redressability in the conventional sense is irrelevant.” Sunstein, supra note 5, at 225–26. 
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and the significance of those rights, we do not think that such relaxation 
necessarily renders the notion of redressability either irrelevant or unprincipled. 
One can tie the denial of a procedural right to a plaintiff’s burden to show 
immediacy and traceability of harm by recognizing what Congress’s requirement 
of procedure implies about its understanding of the likelihood of immediate harm. 
If Congress mandated a procedure for an agency to follow before acting, then one 
can surmise that Congress envisioned that the procedure might convince the 
agency to act differently. Or, to use Professor Sunstein’s terminology, the 
procedure changes agency incentives and, even though it does not dictate 
outcomes, it can change likely outcomes.107 For that reason, the government 
cannot assert that the agency would have made the same decision even if it had 
followed the procedure. Such an assertion would contradict Congress’s implicit 
understanding that the procedure might have mattered.  
Similarly, if Congress mandated that an agency follow the procedure well 
before the ultimate agency action would cause injury against which the procedure 
is meant to protect, then Congress must have believed that the harm was 
sufficiently imminent for the agency to have to consider it now rather than later. 
But, that implies that the harm is sufficiently imminent for the plaintiff reasonably 
to worry about it now. Beyond these two observations, however, procedure has no 
relationship to the immediacy or redressability of the harm. Hence, the relationship 
of the procedure to the harm justifies relaxing the plaintiff’s burden so he need not 
show either that the procedure would have changed the government decision or 
that the resulting harm was sufficiently imminent to warrant bothering the court to 
protect the plaintiff against it. Any relaxation of standing requirements beyond 
these two points would simply be an arbitrary assertion by a court that, for some 
unexplained reason, immediacy or traceability of harm is not necessary for 
standing when Congress happens to have provided a procedural right. 
One might object that even the limited relaxation of causal nexus and 
immediacy that we read footnote seven to support is unwarranted under our 
rationale of congressional motivation. Congress may have added procedure simply 
to increase the costs of agency action to discourage such action,108 or it may have 
added procedure to provide a fire-alarm system that allows opponents to alert 
Congress about impending agency action.109 But, allowing judges to deny 
plaintiffs’ standing merely because of a remote possibility that Congress’s 
motivation for adding procedure was perversely unrelated to improving the agency 
decision-making process, essentially would permit judges to override legislators’ 
likely understanding of causal connections between procedures and agency 
outcomes. At the very least, judges should not do so without a persuasive showing 
                                                                                                                
 107. See id. (“A procedural right is created, not because it necessarily yields 
particular outcomes, but because it structures incentives and creates pressures that Congress 
has deemed important to effective regulation.”). 
 108. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the 
Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 402 (1978). 
 109. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
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by a defendant that the particular procedure at issue was motivated by something 
other than a desire to improve the agency decision-making process. Moreover, we 
cannot think of a more limited relaxation of redressability and immediacy that 
would be consistent with footnote seven, especially in light of the hypothetical 
proposed dam it discusses. 
Massachusetts v. EPA provides an example of the Court applying 
footnote seven to relax redressability requirements in an unjustified and ad hoc 
manner. Massachusetts’ first error was its determination that a citizen-suit 
provision provides a procedural right as that term is used in Lujan’s footnote 
seven. In Massachusetts, the Court reasoned that the statutorily provided right to 
challenge the EPA’s denial of a petition asking it to regulate an air pollutant was a 
procedural right.110 Although one can undoubtedly characterize the right to sue as a 
procedural right, it differs in fundamental ways from a right to have the agency 
follow a statutorily specified procedure, which is the kind of procedural right to 
which footnote seven seems to refer. Indeed, the example of an agency preparing 
an EIS for a proposed dam in footnote seven makes the distinction regarding the 
nature of the procedural right at issue abundantly clear. 
The Massachusetts Court’s second error was in relaxing the redressability 
standard in an unspecified manner not tied in any logical way to the procedural 
right it found in the statute.111 Massachusetts did allege a concrete injury—the loss 
of land along the littoral zone due to a rise in sea level that would result from 
global warming.112 The problem was that the petitioners could not predict with any 
reliability how carbon emissions from motor vehicles would affect the global rise 
in temperatures. The emission of carbon might account for an imperceptible 
amount of sea-level rise, and might even be offset by other countries increasing 
their carbon emissions.113 And, any loss of coastal land due to failure to reduce 
                                                                                                                
 110. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). 
 111. Id. at 517–18. See also id. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that 
the majority never explained how its “special solicitude” for Massachusetts affected its 
standing analysis except for “an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish 
standing on traditional terms”). 
 112. Id. at 521–23. 
 113. See id. at 546 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court contends that regulating 
domestic motor vehicle emissions will reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and 
therefore redress Massachusetts’s injury. But even if regulation does reduce emissions—to 
some indeterminate degree, given events elsewhere in the world—the Court never explains 
why that makes it likely that the injury in fact—the loss of land—will be redressed.”) 
(emphasis in original); Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. 
L. REV. 249, 257 (2009) (“the Court . . . characterized Massachusetts’ injury as including an 
inevitable future loss of its coastline, however remote and quantitatively uncertain that loss 
may be”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 68 (“[The Court] sustained Massachusetts’s right to sue based on fairly generalized and 
speculative claims of injury and causation.”) 
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motor vehicle carbon emissions would be temporally remote from the denial of the 
plaintiffs’ petition.114 
The Massachusetts Court stated up front that the procedural right 
warranted relaxing redressability in some unspecified manner. It then proceeded to 
simply assert that, despite significant uncertainty about whether and how failure to 
regulate greenhouse gasses would affect the plaintiff’s interest, the plaintiff had 
met its lowered burden of proving redressability.115 One is left to wonder what the 
lower burden entailed, let alone why the court thought a lower burden was 
justified. In Massachusetts, the Court did state, “[w]hen a litigant is vested with a 
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the 
requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that 
allegedly harmed the litigant.”116 In so stating, the Court seems to recognize that 
the existence of procedure must defeat a government claim that the agency’s 
decision would have been the same even if the procedure had been followed. The 
problem is that the Massachusetts Court took the further step of holding that 
somehow the change in the agency decision would protect the plaintiff against 
injury even though there was no indication that the agency action itself affected the 
plaintiff in a sufficiently specified manner.117 
Without properly recognizing the scope of footnote seven’s procedural 
rights and the role that those rights play as an expression of Congress’s 
understanding about the likelihood that an action will occur, any relaxation of 
redressability and immediacy will necessarily face the problem of arbitrary line 
drawing. This problem helps explain why the circuit courts have had difficulty in 
applying footnote seven in a consistent manner.118 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
have both allowed an unspecified relaxation of traceability/redressability 
requirements,119 while the D.C. Circuit has suggested a “substantial probability” 
                                                                                                                
 114. The Court recognized that the rise in sea level was a remote risk, albeit one 
of potentially catastrophic harm. Nonetheless, the Court held that the “risk” would be 
reduced “if the petitioners received the relief they [sought],” (even though the Court could 
not assure that the harm would be reduced). 549 U.S. at 526. See also id. at 542 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (“[A]ccepting a century-long time horizon and a series of compounded 
estimates renders requirements of imminence and immediacy utterly toothless.”).  
 115. Id. at 525–26. 
 116. Id. at 518. 
 117. Id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Petitioners are never able to trace their 
alleged injuries back through this complex web to the fractional amount of global emissions 
that might have been limited with EPA standards.”). 
 118. Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 99 (1995) (noting a split in the 
circuits regarding how to apply footnote seven). 
 119. Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 452 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(summarizing the Ninth Circuit’s test as “[o]nce a plaintiff has established an injury in fact 
under NEPA, the causation and redressability requirements are relaxed,” and the Tenth 
Circuit’s test as relatively easy for procedural rights plaintiffs to achieve standing if they 
have a concrete injury); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All 
Injury to None, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 59–61 (2005) (citing Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. 
Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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test.120 In Florida Key Deer v. Stickney,121 a district court “found redressability not 
because the concrete injury could be redressed, here the endangerment of the Key 
deer, but rather because the procedural injury, not consulting with the [U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service], could be redressed by a court order.”122 Much of the 
inconsistency in the meaning of footnote seven stems from courts attempting to 
attribute a level of significance to procedural rights that footnote seven cannot 
support. 
In sum, the best reading of footnote seven recognizes that, by creating 
procedural rights, Congress expects that procedure matters. If Congress requires an 
agency to follow a certain procedure before taking an action that would cause 
some concrete injury to an individual, then the judiciary should defer to 
Congress’s implicit judgment that the procedure was an important step for 
protecting against such an injury. Under this reading, footnote seven only 
precludes the agency from arguing that it might have made the same decision had 
it followed required procedures or that the injury from the action is too temporally 
remote. Courts should not read footnote seven to lower the constitutional 
requirements of immediacy and redressability in any other way. Thus, our reading 
also provides clarity for lower courts regarding what constitutes a procedural right 
under footnote seven and what factual showing footnote seven excuses a plaintiff 
from having to make. Most importantly, by identifying the significance of 
Congress’s inclusion of a procedural requirement in a statute, this reading respects 
Congress’s superior institutional capacity to recognize harms and, relatedly, the 
procedures warranted to protect against those harms. 
V. STRUCTURAL EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF 
INJURY AND CAUSAL CHAINS 
Through the concurrence and footnote seven, Lujan identifies instances in 
which judges can rely on Congress’s explicit and implicit recognition of harms 
and, thus, shape standing analysis. We contend that the principle underlying these 
instances can apply even in the absence of a particularized statutory cause of 
action or procedural right. In the absence of such provisions, courts might still find 
evidence—from the structure of the statute or the story of its passage—of 
congressional understanding of the significance of possible injuries in fact and 
causal chains between injuries and regulatory violations.123 
                                                                                                                
 120. Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(“[U]nless there is a substantial probability . . . that the substantive agency action that 
disregarded a procedural requirement created a demonstrable risk, or caused a demonstrable 
increase in an existing risk of injury to the particularized interests of the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff lacks standing.”); see also Mank, supra note 119, at 45. 
 121. 864 F.Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 
 122. Gatchel, supra note 118, at 103. 
 123. Although this proposition might seem controversial in the standing context, 
much Constitutional Law doctrine derives from the assumption that statutory structure 
implies congressional determination of the significance of private entities’ conduct. For 
example, courts defer to Congress’s determination under a rational basis standard of review 
when evaluating whether regulated conduct has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
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The controversy addressed by the Court in Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw124 provides an illustrative example of how statutory structure can 
appropriately affect standing. In Laidlaw, an environmental group brought suit 
against a wastewater treatment plant, alleging noncompliance with a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination (“NPDES”) permit.125 The plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendant’s discharge of pollution into the North Tyger River, in violation of 
its permit, instilled fear in the plaintiffs, who lived near and had previously used 
the River. Central to the issue of standing was “[t]he reasonableness of [the] fear 
that led the affiants to respond to [the defendant’s] concededly ongoing conduct by 
refraining from use of the . . . River and surrounding areas.”126 While the court 
concluded that the members’ fears were reasonable, it did not fully explain its 
analysis.127 It simply “found nothing ‘improbable’ about the proposition that a 
company's continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river 
would cause nearby residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway.”128 
Instead of employing this fuzzy reasonableness analysis, which is 
subjective in nature and gives little direction to lower courts,129 the Court would 
have stood on firmer ground had it reasoned from the structure of the Clean Water 
Act (“CWA”). The CWA requires polluters to meet a discharge standard 
achievable by use of the Best Available Technology (“BAT”).130 The BAT 
standard requires polluters to reduce pollution discharge even if the water into 
which they are releasing that pollution contains pollution levels below those that 
have been shown to threaten human health and the environment. Thus, the BAT 
standard implicitly recognizes that quantities of pollutants below current health 
based thresholds “may reasonably be anticipated to pose an unacceptable risk to 
                                                                                                                
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“In assessing the scope of Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause . . . . We need not determine whether respondents’ 
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only 
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) (“[W]hen Congress has determined that an 
activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is 
rational.”); see also, Sunstein, supra note 5, at 230 (suggesting that the Court should review 
injury in fact determinations using the rational relationship standard that it applies to effects 
on interstate commerce in commerce clause cases). 
 124. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 125. Id. at 177. 
 126. Id. at 184. 
 127. See William Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw, Standing and Citizen 
Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 235 (Richard Lazarus & Oliver Houck, eds., 
2005) (“Laidlaw . . . manifested deference to legislative judgments, but did not foreclose 
revival of more judge-centered, common law-like conceptions of harms to survive a 
standing challenge. How Article II fits into standing analysis remains uncertain.”). 
 128. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. The Court also baldly asserted that “[t]he 
proposition is entirely reasonable.” Id. at 184–85. 
 129. See John F. Manning, Note, Going Back to SCRAP in Order to Refine Steel: 
The Supreme Court Loosens the Modern Constraints on the Doctrine of Standing in Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (Toc), Inc., 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
215, 234–35 (2001). 
 130. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012). 
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human health or the environment.”131 That is the only coherent justification for 
implementing stringent technological-based standards to reduce discharges when 
pollution levels do not impose known risks. In essence, by imposing technological-
based standards, the CWA manifests congressional recognition that plaintiff’s 
members’ fears were reasonable. And, because of Congress’s superior institutional 
capacity to evaluate such fear, the Court should have deferred to this implicit 
congressional recognition. Thus, our understanding of Congress’s role in standing 
would have given the Laidlaw Court a less subjective basis for its determination 
that fear of pollution in the North Tyger River and its surrounding area was 
sufficiently concrete and palpable to constitute injury in fact. 
An avowed formalist might object that the structure of the statute does not 
ineluctably lead to the conclusion that Congress recognized the threat from low-
level pollution to be a reasonable threat of injury.132 For example, Congress might 
have simply desired to subsidize the manufacturers of pollution reduction 
equipment. We believe, however, that such a response to our argument carries 
formalism to an indefensible extreme. Unless a statute were to state explicitly the 
underlying understanding of those who voted for it, which statutes virtually never 
do, one can always find an alternative explanation of what motivated the passage 
of the statute. But standing law only requires that the plaintiff show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the injury she alleges is sufficiently concrete to 
constitute injury in fact due to the defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct.133 
Therefore, the courts would do best when evaluating standing to ask whether the 
structure of the statute clearly manifests a likely understanding of those who voted 
for it. Requiring more than this simply allows a judge to turn judicial passive 
virtues into passive aggressiveness,134 dismissing actions simply because she does 
                                                                                                                
 131. H.R. REP. NO. 95-830, at 83 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4424, 4458. 
 132. But even avowed textualist formalists are willing to consider the overall 
structure of a statute as well as the context surrounding its enactment to determine statutory 
meaning. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 467, 478 (2014). 
 133. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
149, 163 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the elements of standing are not subject to 
heightened standards of proof). Thus, for example, it is sufficient that a plaintiff use an area 
that is visibly affected to claim injury to her aesthetic sensibilities, see Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972), even without further proof that she truly finds the 
sight distasteful. This is not to be confused with the requirement of showing that future 
injury will actually occur, which seems to require proof that harm is “certainly impending,” 
or a “substantial risk.” See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 1150 n.5 
(2013). That requirement derives from the fact that injury in fact must not be speculative, 
rather than from the level of proof by which it must be proven. 
 134. Cf. Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and 
the Problematic Establishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67–68 (Spring 
1995) (first referring to judicial exercise of discretion about whether to hear a case as 
“passive aggressive”). 
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not find the alleged injury or causal chain sufficiently convincing, or even perhaps 
because she simply does not like the probable outcome of the case.135 
Thus, reading the structure of statutes to support likely congressional 
understandings about injuries and causal chains has the potential to ameliorate 
accusations of judicial abuse in applying standing doctrine. For example, earlier 
this Article demonstrated that the Court’s determination of standing in 
Massachusetts v. EPA was based on an indefensible reading of Lujan’s footnote 
seven, and appeared to be an assertion of standing by judicial fiat.136 But we 
believe that the Massachusetts Court reached the correct outcome with regard to 
the standing inquiry in that case for other reasons.  
In particular, our analysis of Laidlaw can be applied to Massachusetts and 
would support the conclusion that the state of Massachusetts had standing on 
analytically firmer ground than the Court’s actual rationale. In Massachusetts, no 
one questioned whether the state alleged a concrete injury: loss of land to rising 
sea level is certainly concrete. And, by the time the case reached the Court, no one 
seriously questioned whether climate change was occurring or whether it would 
cause at least some rise in sea level.137 Massachusetts’ standing was vulnerable 
because of the uncertainty related to the extent to which failure to regulate carbon 
emissions from mobile sources would contribute to global warming and the 
concomitant expected rise in sea level.138 But this potential bar to standing is 
essentially the same as the one presented by the complaint in Laidlaw; although 
automobile carbon emissions would make some contribution to global warming, it 
was not clear if that contribution would noticeably affect any loss of coastal land 
from climate change. The Clean Air Act (“CAA”), however, like the CWA, 
imposes technology-based standards on air pollutants, even when levels of 
pollution are below those known to be harmful.139 Such standards implicitly 
recognize that it is reasonable to conclude that the effects from a small 
contribution to pollution levels pose a significant threat, even if we do not 
currently have the means to verify and quantify that threat. Hence, in 
Massachusetts, the Court should have deferred to this implicit statutory 
recognition and concluded that, even if plaintiffs could not prove the likely extent 
of injury with much reliability, it was enough for them to show that lack of 
regulation would contribute to some pollution that would, in turn, contribute to 
global warming. 
                                                                                                                
 135. Pierce, supra note 12, at 1742–43 (“[J]udges provide access to the courts to 
individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges”). 
 136. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text. 
 137. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007) (stating there is a strong 
consensus among the scientific community that climate change is linked to rising sea 
levels). 
 138. See id. at 542–43 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2010). 
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VI. STATUTORY PURPOSE AS EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL 
RECOGNITION OF INJURY AND CAUSAL CHAINS 
Sometimes, courts can rely on an obvious purpose of a statute to impute a 
legislative understanding of the gravity of injuries or the likelihood of causal 
nexus. Although such use of statutory purpose requires consideration of the 
context of statutory enactment that goes beyond the actual words and structure of 
the statute, we believe it can provide judicial guidance that is preferable to 
allowing judges free rein to evaluate the significance of injuries and the likelihood 
of causal chains on their own, without statutory constraint. 
The value of using statutory purpose to guide judicial standing inquiries is 
illustrated by considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D.140 In that case, the plaintiff, Linda R.S., was a mother of an illegitimate child 
whose father, Richard D., had failed to provide child support. The Texas Criminal 
Code made it a crime for a father not to provide such support, but the district 
attorney refused to prosecute Richard D. because the Texas courts had consistently 
read the child support statute to apply only to the fathers of legitimate children.141 
Linda R.S. sued to have the courts declare the statute as construed by the Texas 
courts to violate the equal protection clause, and essentially to order the Texas 
courts to apply the statute to fathers of illegitimate children, essentially subjecting 
Richard D. to potential prosecution.142 
The Court found that Linda R.S. did not have standing to bring her claim 
because the matter was not redressable. The majority reasoned that subjecting 
Richard D. to the statute would not necessarily induce him to pay child support.143 
Having failed to pay child support, Richard D. was already subject to prosecution 
under the statute, and, hence, would not gain immunity by paying the support he 
owed. Essentially, the Court used the fact that Richard was already subject to 
criminal prosecution to countermand the intuitive proposition that “the threat of 
penal sanctions had something more than a ‘speculative’ effect on a person’s 
conduct.”144 The perversity of that holding can be illustrated by imagining what the 
Court would have done had Linda R.S. been a black child, and the allegations in 
the case had been that the Texas Supreme Court had construed the statute not to 
apply to fathers of black children. It is hard to conceive of the Court denying 
standing in that hypothetical. Yet, the question of whether the Court could redress 
Linda R.S.’s loss of support payments would have been the same. 
                                                                                                                
 140. 410 U.S. § 614 (1973). 
 141. Id. at 615. 
 142. Id. at 616. The plaintiff also asked the Court to order Richard D. to pay child 
support. Id. at 620 (dissenting opinion). It makes sense that Linda R.S. would not have 
standing to seek such an order because the order would turn the criminal statute into a civil 
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 144. See id. at 621 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Although Linda R.S. was an equal protection challenge, using statutory 
purpose to inform the standing inquiry makes sense because the constitutional 
claim was based on a wrongful denial of financial support that the statute 
guaranteed to children. Moreover, the fact that the statute at issue was enacted by 
the Texas legislature rather than Congress does not render this Article’s approach 
to standing irrelevant as long as one accepts that state legislators enjoy the same 
institutional superiority as Congress does, vis-à-vis the courts. 
A purpose-guided inquiry into whether the alleged equal protection 
violation injured Linda R.S. would have avoided the perverse holding of that case. 
It is unlikely that Texas adopted its criminal nonsupport statute solely out of some 
belief that failure to pay child support was heinous enough to justify locking up 
deadbeat dads. Rather, it is almost certain that this criminal provision was meant, 
in large part, to encourage fathers to pay child support, thereby relieving the state 
from bearing full financial responsibility to support children whose fathers had left 
the family.145 If one accepts that motivation for the statute, then it is unlikely that a 
father who failed to pay child support for some time, but who was currently paying 
it, would face prosecution. Such prosecution would put the father in jail, where he 
would not be able to earn money to meet his child support obligation, undermining 
the purpose of the statute. Hence, an astute judge would almost certainly conclude 
that members of the Texas legislature would have understood the statute as 
encouraging fathers who had failed to pay child support to do so in the future, 
contrary to the majority’s assertion. 
Another case in which consideration of statutory purpose might have led 
to a different, and almost certainly more justifiable, outcome is Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon (“EKWRO”).146 In EKWRO, the plaintiffs alleged 
that IRS regulations reducing the care to indigents that hospitals had to provide to 
obtain nonprofit status would result in hospitals providing less free care to them.147 
Principles of microeconomics suggest that generally hospitals would reduce levels 
of free care to indigents in response to the removal of economic sanctions for that 
                                                                                                                
 145. There is considerable evidence that legislatures nationwide were considering 
how to enforce child support payments during the 1960s and 1970s as the number of 
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 147. Id. at 33. 
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reduction.148 More importantly, when Congress addressed the relevant statutory 
provisions that defined the conditions for hospitals’ nonprofit status, the House 
initially included a provision removing the condition that hospitals provide any 
indigent care so long as they meet the other requirements of section 501(c)(3) of 
the Revenue Code.149 The Senate, however, removed this provision of the House 
Bill,150 and the Senate version was ultimately enacted into law.151 It does not take 
much imagination to conclude that maneuvering by the House and Senate was 
aimed at relieving and then reinstating conditions that would influence the care 
provided by nonprofit hospitals. Thus the best explanations for this maneuvering 
implies that Congress understood the Revenue Code’s conditioning nonprofit 
status on the provision of indigent care as inducement to provide such care. Given 
Congress’s institutional capacity to predict likely effects of such conditions, it 
follows that the IRS’s loosening of such requirements likely reduced hospitals’ 
provision of care to the plaintiffs. Thus the EKWRO Court’s contrary 
determination flies in the face of the most intelligible congressional understanding 
of the effect of the condition it imposed on hospitals’ nonprofit status. 
CONCLUSION 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court held that when Congress 
creates a legal interest to see that the law is followed, the deprivation of that 
interest, without further injury, is not sufficient for a plaintiff to meet Article III’s 
standing requirements. Lujan created significant uncertainty about Congress’s 
ability to influence judicial standing inquiries by creating statutory rights, 
especially in light of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the majority’s footnote 
seven, both of which suggest Congress retains some role regarding such inquiries. 
This Article has shown that Kennedy’s concurrence and footnote seven are best 
explained by recognizing that Congress is institutionally superior to courts in 
evaluating the concreteness of likely harms and the causal chains between 
statutory violations and those harms—evaluations that may bear on whether a 
plaintiff in a particular case has met the injury in fact and traceability elements of 
Article III standing.  
The Article takes this explanation further by showing that the structure of 
statutory provisions that do not create causes of action might nonetheless reveal 
                                                                                                                
 148. Essentially, the regulatory change lowered the hospital’s price for failing to 
provide care. Basic price theory predicts that lowering the price of engaging in conduct will 
increase the overall conduct in the market. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC 
PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1996); see also Jonathan Nash, Standing’s 
Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1312–14 (2013) (noting that plaintiffs in EKWRO 
would suffer a decreased probability of receiving care, and noting that Congress might 
“recognize that harms in administrative law cases are generally probabilistic or systemic” 
and favor agency redress of “harms of precisely that sort”). 
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 289–90 (1969) (Conf. Rep.). 
 150. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 61 (1969). 
 151. See E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 331–32 
(D.D.C. 1973), rev’d sub nom. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated & dismissed, Simon 
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
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legislators’ likely understanding about the significance of certain harms and about 
the closeness of the causal connections between harms and statutory violations. 
This congressional understanding should influence judges’ standing inquiries. 
Finally, the Article suggests that in the absence of other evidence of Congress’s 
understanding of injuries and causal nexi, courts would do well to rely on statutory 
purpose in evaluating injury in fact and traceability given that the alternative is 
judges’ subjective evaluation without meaningful constraint by relevant legal 
standards. 
 
